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MU'MIN v. VIRGINIA
111 S. Ct. 1899 (1991)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
Dawud Majid Mu'Min was convicted of capital murder in the
Virginia Circuit Court, Prince William County. The Virginia Supreme
Court affirmed his conviction. 239 Va. 433, 389 S.E.2d 886. See case
summary ofMu'Min v. Commonwealth, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3,
No. 1,p. 17(1990). Subsequently, Mu'Min was granted certiorariby the
United States Supreme Court. Mu'Min's case garnered substantial pretrial publicity. Mu'Min claimed that his sixth amendment right to a fair
and impartial jury and his fourteenth amendment right to due process
were violated when the trial judge refused to permit questioning on voir
dire of prospective jurors who had read or heard something about
Mu'Min's case as to the content of what they had read or heard. After
a motion for individual voir dire was denied, voir dire was conducted by
asking the jurors whether they were biased by pretrial publicity. Initially
the jurors were questioned as a group and then in panels of four. The
examination was conducted in a manner where silence as opposed to an
affirmative response indicated impartiality.
HOLDING
The United States Supreme Court held that "content questions" are
not constitutionally required. The Court stated that "the trial court's
failure to ask [content] questions must render the defendant's trial
fundamentally unfair." Mu'Min v. Commonwealth, 111 S. Ct. 1899,
1905 (1991)(citingMurphyv. Florida,421U.S. 794,799 (1975)). Thus,
as with other findings of fact, the Court will not disturb the trial court's
finding of juror impartiality unless it is a "'manifest error."' Mu'Min,
111 S. Ct. at 1907 (citing Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031
(1984))(quoting Irvin v. Dowd, supra,366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961)).
ANALYSIS / APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
Content Questions in Voir Dire are not Constitutionally Required
The Majority stated, "[v]oir dire examination serves the dual
purposes of enabling the court to select an impartial jury and assisting
counsel in exercising peremptory challenges." Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at
1908. By the wording, "enabling" and "assisting," the Court suggested
that voir dire was more of a procedural device to be used by thejudge and
defense counsel to insure that the defendant's constitutional rights were
not violated. With respect to voir dire, the Court stated, "'[tihe trial
judge's function ... is not unlike that of the jurors later on in the trial.
Both must reach conclusions as to impartiality and credibility by relying
on their own evaluations of demeanor evidence and of responses to
questions."' Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1904 (quoting Rosales-Lopez v.
UnitedStates, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981)). In addition, the Court stated,
"our own cases have stressed the wide discretion granted to the trial court
in conducting voir dire in the area ofpretrial publicity and in other areas
of inquiry that might tend to show jury bias." Id. at 1906.
In federal courts, the Court's authority is supervisory. As to state
courts, the Court's authority "is limited to enforcing the commands of
the United States Constitution." 111 S. Ct. at 1903. InMu'Min the Court
stated,
the obligation to impanel an impartial jury lies in the first
instance with the trial judge, and because he must rely largely
on his immediate perceptions, federal judges have been accorded ample discretion in determining how best to conduct
the voir dire.

111 S. Ct. at 1904 (emphasis added)(quotingRosales-Lopez,451 U.S. at
189). Rosales-Lopez was decided under the Court's supervisory authority; therefore, if the Court will not tell a federal court how it should
conduct voir dire, where the Court "enjoy[s] more latitude in setting
standards for voir dire," then the Court will not tell a state court exactly
how to conduct voir dire. 111 S. Ct. at 1904 (emphasis added).
Mu'Min relied on two types of cases to support his claim that his
constitutional rightto afairand impartialjury and his right to due process
were violated when his motion for "content questions" was denied by the
trial judge. He relied on cases with strong racial or ethnic overtones and
cases with substantial pretrial publicity.
In those cases with strong racial or ethnic overtones, the Court
required a voir dire inquiry regarding racial prejudice. The Court
identified two themes which necessitated such an inquiry:
first, the possibility of racial prejudice against a black defendant charged with a violent crime against a white person is
sufficiently real that the Fourteenth Amendment (sic) requires
that inquiry be made into racial prejudice; second, the trial
court retains great latitude in deciding what questions would
be asked on voir dire.
Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1904 (emphasis added). In cases with racial or
ethnic overtones, the Court was "careful not to specify the particulars"
which a trial court should use to cover the subject of racial or ethnic
prejudice. Id. at 1908. The Court stated, "[Mu'Min] asserts that the
Fourteenth Amendment (sic) requires more in the way of voir dire with
respect to pretrial publicity than our cases have held that it does with
respect to racial or ethnic prejudice." Id at 1904. Thus, even if the Court
were to accept the petitioner's analogy between his own highly publicized case and those cases involving racial or ethnic prejudice, the Court
would not require "content questions" on voir dire because an inquiry
was already made into pretrial publicity as with the issue of racial
prejudice in the racial or ethnic cases and, furthermore, because "content
question" are too specific. Ultimately, the Court stated that the issue of
whether the trial judge's denial of Mu'Min's motion for content questions violated his constitutional rights was really a question of whether
"the trial court's failure to ask these questions render[ed] the defendant's
trial fundamentally unfair." Id. at 1905.
Mu'Min relied heavily upon Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961),
to show that the jury was so biased that his rights to a fair and impartial
jury and to due process were violated. The Court distinguished Irvin
from Mu'Min by stating, "while the pretrial publicity in this case appears
to have been substantial, it was not of the same kind or extent as that
found to exist in Irvin." Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1907. The Court found
that in Irvin "[t]wo-thirds of the jurors actually seated had formed an
opinion that the defendant was guilty .... "Id. at 1906 (emphasis added),
whereas in Mu'Min's case "none... indicated that he had formed an
opinion as to guilt .
I.."
Id. at 1907 (emphasis added). Also, the Court
stated, "[h]ad the trial court in this case been confronted with the 'wave
of public passion' engendered by pretrial publicity that occurred in
connection with Irvin's trial, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment might well have required more extensive examination of
potential jurors than it undertook here." Id. at 1907 (emphasis added).
Therefore, the Court dismissed Mu'Min's claim as to "content questions" as a constitutional right based upon his showing of pre-trial
publicity.
Absent a manifest error in the trial court's determination of juror
impartiality, the Court reiterated its unwillingness to overrule a finding
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of juror impartiality. To find manifest error the Court must determine
"'whether the jurors... had such fixed opinions that they could not
judge impartially the guilt of the defendant."' Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. 1899,
1908 (quoting Patton,467 U.S. at 1035) (emphasis added). In the present
case, the Court found that there was no manifest error because "the voir
dire examination conducted by the trial court in this case was by no
means perfunctory." Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1908. Thus, it is clear that
the Court requires a fact specific showing of manifest error in voir dire
to prove that a defendant's constitutional rights were violated rather
than a constitutionally mandated inquiry in voir dire using content
questions to insure that his constitutional rights are not violated.
In dissent, Justice Kennedy stated, "the trial judge should have
substantial discretion in conducting the voir dire,but, in my judgement,
findings of impartiality must be based on something more than the mere
silence of the individual in response to questions asked en masse." 111
S. Ct. at 1919. Kennedy believed that "a juror's acknowledgement of
exposure to pretrial publicity initiates a duty to assess that individual
juror's ability to be impartial" which mandates a "sufficient colloquy
with the individual juror...." Id. at 1919 (emphasis added). Kennedy
was concerned with the "actual impartiality of the seated jurors, and..
an adequate examination of those... jurors...." Id. at 1918.
The fact that content questions are not constitutionally guaranteed
does not foreclose defense counsel from requesting that content ques-

tions be asked on voir dire in highly publicized cases. As the majority
and the dissent note, the trial judge is afforded ample discretion on voir
dire. Prior to jury selection, evidence of all pretrial publicity should be
offered and it should be forcefully argued that fairness demands a more
probing inquiry than the constitutional minimum permitted by Mu'Min.
If content questioning is denied and there are additional adverse
rulings affecting jury selection, including further restrictions on voir
dire, these denials can be evidence of an aggregate violation of the sixth
amendment right to a fair and impartial jury and the right to effective
assistance of counsel.
Issues which could affect a defendant's constitutional rights should
be alleged individually and in the aggregate. For example, denial of a
change of venue or of individual voir dire standing alone may not
constitute a sixth amendment violation but if considered with restrictions on voir dire, such as in Mu'Min's case where the court also denied
his motion for additional peremptory challenges, all of these denials may
add up to an error of constitutional magnitude. The Virginia Capital
Case Clearinghouse has available a model composite motion addressing
the denial of change of venue, additional peremptory challenges, individual voir dire and other voir dire restrictions.
Summary and analysis by:
Marcus E. Garcia

COLEMAN v. THOMPSON
111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991)
United States Supreme Court

FACTS
Roger Keith Coleman was sentenced to die as a result of his
conviction for rape and capital murder. The Virginia Supreme Court
affirmed both the convictions and the sentence. Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31 (1983). Coleman appealed to the United States
Supreme Court, but was denied certiorari. Coleman v. Virginia,465 U.S.
1109 (1984).
Coleman then filed a writ of habeas corpus in state court, raising
numerous federal constitutional claims, including some that he had not
raised on direct appeal. The Circuit Court did not provide any relief.
Coleman then filed a notice of appeal with the Circuit Court 33 days after
entry of final judgment and subsequently filed a petition for appeal in the
Virginia Supreme Court.
The Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss Coleman's appeal on
the ground that it violated Virginia Supreme Court Rule 5:9 which
provides that no appeal shall be allowed unless a notice of appeal is filed
with the trial court within 30 days of final judgment. The Virginia
Supreme Court did not act immediately on the Commonwealth's motion,
and both parties filed several briefs on the subject of the motion to dismiss
and on the merits of the claims in Coleman's petition. Nonetheless, the
Virginia Supreme Court dismissed Coleman's appeal. The court order
recited the procedural history of Coleman's appeal and stated only that
"upon consideration whereof, the motion to dismiss is granted and the
petition for appeal is dismissed." The United States Supreme Court again
denied certiorari. Coleman v. Bass, 484 U.S. 918 (1987).
Coleman next filed a habeas petition in federal court, presenting four
federal constitutional claims that he had raised on direct appeal in the
Virginia Supreme Court and seven claims that he had raised for the first
time in state habeas. The United States District Court concluded that the

dismissal of his appeal in state habeas had the effect of a procedural default
for Coleman's seven claims.
The United States Court ofAppeals for the Fourth Circuit also held
that Coleman had defaulted all of the claims that he had raised for the first
time in state habeas and affirmed the lower court's decision. Coleman 1'.
Thompson, 895 F.2d 139 (1990). Coleman argued that under Harrisv.
Reedthe federal courts could not treat the Virginia Supreme Court's denial
as a procedural default because the court had not "clearly and expressly"
specified the basis of its opinion. The Fourth Circuit held that the Virginia
Supreme Court's decision rested on adequate and independent state
procedural grounds and that Coleman had not shown cause to excuse the
default. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

HOLDING
The United States Supreme Court cited the concerns of federalism
and comity in affirming the lower court's decision. The Court held that
the Virginia Supreme Court's decision "fairly appears" to rest primarily
on state law because the dismissal does not mention federal law and
because the underlying dismissal motion was based solely upon state
procedural grounds of failure to give timely notice of appeal.
More broadly, the Court held that review ofa federal claim defaulted
in state court on adequate and independent state grounds is barred unless
the petitioner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice
as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that
failure to consider the claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of
justice.
The Court also rejected Coleman's contention that late filing by his
attorney could serve as "cause" for the default. The Court responded that
attorney error can serve as "cause" only if it is deemed ineffective
assistance of counsel violative ofthe sixth amendment, and that since there

